Privacy and Liveliness for Reputation Systems

Privacy-respecting reputation systems have been constructed based on anonymous payment systems in order to implement raters' anonymity. To the best of our knowledge, all these systems suffer from the problem of having a "final state", i. e., a system state in which users have no incentive anymore to behave honestly because they reached a maximum reputation or they can no longer be rated. Thus the reputation is in fact no longer lively. We propose a novel approach to address the problem of liveliness by the employment of negative ratings. We tie ratings to actual interactions to force users to also deposit their negative ratings at the reputation server. Otherwise they would not be able to interact any more. Additionally we enhance users' anonymity by limiting timing attacks through the use of transferable-eCash-based payment systems.

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