Using Selene to Verify Your Vote in JCJ

We show how to combine the individual verification mechanism of Selene with the coercion-resistant e-voting scheme from Juels, Catalano and Jakobsson (JCJ). This results in an e-voting scheme which allows the voter to check directly that her vote is counted as intended, but still allows her to mitigate coercion.

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