The Organizations of Academic Work

tions that place restrictions on the interpretation of the data than I have seen done to date. Moreover, conclusions that appear to be intuitively "obvious" (e.g., toughness is more profitable when it generates softness in an opponent) are shown to be only one of several possibilities that could emerge. While he is very skillful in elaborating the consequences of toughness, he has more trouble ascertaining the causes of toughness. The strategic question is, How do we know whether an opponent will be tough? Are there cues that can be used as reliable indices of toughness? This issue is explored by considering the effects of background factors on the process. Strong relationships obtained between these variables should be instructive. The evidence, however, does not permit us to make such "inferential leaps." Although a number of relationships are found, these are weak, accounting overall for only 5 per cent of the variance in process variables. But all is not lost! The more general implication of these findings leads to, and bolsters, a conclusion arrived at earlier: a negotiator depends more on his strategic analysis of the situation than on some inherent tendency to be soft or tough.