论文信息 - Network competition with price discrimination: ‘bill-and-keep’ is not so bad after all

Network competition with price discrimination: ‘bill-and-keep’ is not so bad after all

Abstract We study the impact of access charges on the incentives to invest in competing telecommunications networks of different quality. High access charges soften competition in the investment stage and can be used to sustain higher profits under competition with two-part tariffs and termination-based price discrimination. Below-cost charges (such as “bill-and-keep” arrangements) have a positive impact on investments.

Tommaso M. Valletti | Carlo Cambini

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