Divided Majority and Information Aggregation: Theory and Experiment

We propose a theory-based experimental approach to compare the properties of approval voting (AV) with thoseof plurality. This comparison is motivated by the theoretical prediction that, in our aggregate uncertainty setup,AV should produce close to first-best outcomes,while pluralitywill not. The experiment shows, first, thatwelfaregains are substantial. Second, both aggregate and individual responses are in line with theoretical predictions,and thus with strategic voting. Finally, subjects' behavior under AV highlights the need to study equilibria inasymmetric strategies.

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