The title of this session asks about the roles of money or credit in the transmission of monetary and real shocks. Our answer, repeated in different forms for more than two decades, is that the analysis of the transmission process is incomplete without both the money and credit markets and their interaction.
For many years, economists ignored the role of the credit markets. Recently, there has been some change. Concerns about financial fragility, banking failures, debt default and loan rationing focussed attention on credit markets. Reexamination of experience during the early 1930's (Ben Bernanke, 1983) raises an issue about whether credit market shocks operated 1) as an independent, or exogenous, impulse supplementing and reinforcing the monetary decline, or 2) as part of the interaction of credit, money (and other financial) markets.
[1]
Joseph E. Stiglitz,et al.
THE CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES OF THE DEPENDENCE OF QUALITY ON PRICE
,
1987
.
[2]
Monetary Policy with a Credit Aggregate Target
,
1982
.
[3]
B. Bernanke,et al.
Non-Monetary Effects of the Financial Crisis in the Propagation of the Great Depression
,
1983
.
[4]
P. Cagan,et al.
Determinants and Effects of Changes in the Stock of Money, 1875-1960
,
1965
.
[5]
J. Stiglitz,et al.
Credit Rationing in Markets with Imperfect Information
,
1981
.
[6]
P. Cagan.
Front matter, Determinants and Effects of Changes in the Stock of Money 1875-1960
,
1965
.