Simulating the Evolution of Modular Neural Systems

Simulating the Evolution of Modular Neural Systems John A. Bullinaria (j.bullinaria@physics.org) School of Computer Science, The University of Birmingham Edgbaston, Birmingham, B15 2TT, UK Abstract The human brain is undoubtedly modular, and there are numerous reasons why it might have evolved to be that way. Rueckl, Cave & Kosslyn (1989) have shown how a clear advantage in having a modular architecture can exist in neural network models of a simplified version of the “what” and “where” vision tasks. In this paper I present a series of simulations of the evolution of such neural systems that show how the advantage c a n cause modularity to evolve. However, a careful analysis indicates that drawing reliable conclusions from such an approach is far from straightforward. Introduction Intuitively, given the obvious potential for disruptive interference, it seems quite reasonable that two independent tasks will be more efficiently carried out separately by two dedicated modules, rather than together by a homogeneous (fully distributed) system. Certainly there is considerable neuropsychological evidence that human brains do operate in such a modular manner (e.g. Shallice, 1988). In particular, the inference from double dissociation to modularity is one of the corner stones of cognitive neuropsychology, and over recent years double dissociation between many tasks have been established, with the implication of associated modularity. Some early neural network models seemed to indicate that fully distributed systems could also result in double dissociation (e.g. Wood, 1978) and hence cast some doubt on the inference of modularity. Since then, the potential for double dissociation in connectionist systems with and without modularity has been well studied (e.g. Plaut, 1995; Bullinaria & Chater, 1995; Bullinaria, 1999), and the early connectionist double dissociations have been seen to be merely the result of small scale artefacts. Several later studies (e.g. Devlin, Gonnerman, Andersen & Seidenberg, 1998; Bullinaria, 1999) have shown how weak double dissociation can arise as a result of resource artifacts (e.g. Shallice, 1988, p232) in fully distributed systems, but it seems that strong double dissociation does require some form of modularity, though not necessarily in the strong (hard-wired, innate and informationally encapsulated) sense of Fodor (1983). Plaut (1995), for example, has shown that double dissociation can result from damage to different parts of a single neural network, and Shallice (1988, p249) lists a number of systems that could result in double dissociation without modularity in the conventional sense. In this paper, I am not so much interested in showing how double dissociation can arise in connectionist systems without modularity, but rather, how modularity can arise in connectionist systems and hence have the potential for exhibiting double dissociation. Of particular interest to us here is the discovery that visual perception involves two distinct cortical pathways (Mishkin, Ungerleider & Macko, 1983) – one running ventrally for identifying objects (“what”), and another running dorsally for determining their spatial locations (“where”). Some time ago, Rueckl, Cave & Kosslyn (1989) considered the interesting question of why “what“ and “where” should be processed by separate visual systems in this way. By performing explicit simulation and analysis of a series of simplified neural network models they were able to show that modular networks were able to generate more efficient internal represent- ations than fully distributed networks, and that they learned more easily how to perform the two tasks. The implication is that any process of evolution by natural selection would result in a modular architecture and hence answer the question of why modularity has arisen. Now, eleven years later, the power of modern computer technology has finally reached a level whereby the relevant explicit evolutionary simulations are now feasible. Already Di Ferdinando, Calabretta & Parisi (2001) have established that modularity can evolve. In this paper, I present the results of further simulations and conclude that, whilst modularity may arise, the situation is not quite as straight-forward as the original comput- ational investigation of Rueckl et al. (1989) suggested. Learning Multiple Tasks Nowadays, the basic structure of simple feed-forward neural network models is well known. We typically use a three layer network of simplified neurons. The input layer activations represent the system’s input (e.g. a simplified retinal image). These activations are passed via weighted connections to the hidden layer where each unit sums its inputs and passes the result through some form of squashing function (e.g. a sigmoid) to produce its own activation level. Finally, these activations are passed by a second layer of weighted connections to the output layer where they are again summed and squashed to produce the output activations (e.g. representations of “what“ and “where”). The connection weights are typically learnt by some form of gradient descent training algorithm whereby the weights are iteratively adjusted so that the network produces increasingly accurate outputs for each input in a set of training data. In this context, the question of modularity relates to the connectivity between the network’s hidden and

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