Modelling Takeover Likelihood

This paper employs a multinomial logit model in an attempt to better understand the motives behind takeovers. The results from the multinomial logit models show that the characteristics of hostile and friendly targets differ significantly and that these differences also vary depending on the time period under investigation. The results give some support to the disciplining role of the hostile takeover. Furthermore, conclusions based on a simple binomial logit model are likely to be misleading and result in incorrect inferences regarding the characteristics of firms subject to takeover.

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