Recursive games: uniform value, Tauberian theorem and the Mertens conjecture “$$Maxmin=\lim v_n=\lim v_{\uplambda }$$Maxmin=limvn=limvλ”

We study two-player zero-sum recursive games with a countable state space and finite action spaces at each state. When the family of n-stage values $$\{v_n,n\ge 1\}$${vn,n≥1} is totally bounded for the uniform norm, we prove the existence of the uniform value. Together with a result in Rosenberg and Vieille (Math Oper Res 39:23–35, 2000), we obtain a uniform Tauberian theorem for recursive game: $$(v_n)$$(vn) converges uniformly if and only if $$(v_{\uplambda })$$(vλ) converges uniformly. We apply our main result to finite recursive games with signals (where players observe only signals on the state and on past actions). When the maximizer is more informed than the minimizer, we prove the Mertens conjecture $$Maxmin=\lim _{n\rightarrow \infty } v_n=\lim _{{\uplambda }\rightarrow 0}v_{\uplambda }$$Maxmin=limn→∞vn=limλ→0vλ. Finally, we deduce the existence of the uniform value in finite recursive game with symmetric information.