The Structure and Performance Consequences of Equity Grants to Employees of New Economy Firms
暂无分享,去创建一个
[1] Richard A. Lambert. Executive Effort and Selection of Risky Projects , 1986 .
[2] Steven Huddart. Tax Planning and the Exercise of Employee Stock Options , 1998 .
[3] Michelle Hanlon,et al. Accounting for Tax Benefits of Employee Stock Options and Implications for Research , 2002 .
[4] Brad M. Barber,et al. Detecting abnormal operating performance: The empirical power and specification of test statistics , 1996 .
[5] Richard W. Hamming,et al. Numerical Methods for Scientists and Engineers , 1963 .
[6] Kenneth J. Martin,et al. Executive compensation and executive incentive problems: an empirical analysis , 1987 .
[7] Rachel M. Hayes,et al. Incentives and Governance in Entrepreneurial Firms , 2001 .
[8] S. Janakiraman,et al. Investment opportunities and the structure of executive compensation , 1996 .
[9] Chip Heath,et al. Psychological Factors and Stock Option Exercise , 1998 .
[10] J. Graham,et al. How Big are the Tax Benefits of Debt? , 1998 .
[11] E. Fama,et al. The Cross‐Section of Expected Stock Returns , 1992 .
[12] David Yermack,et al. Altering the Terms of Executive Stock Options , 1998 .
[13] Arthur H. Dean. Employee Stock Options , 1953 .
[14] R. Lambert,et al. PORTFOLIO CONSIDERATIONS IN VALUING EXECUTIVE-COMPENSATION , 1991 .
[15] Lee-Seok Hwang,et al. CEO Stock-Based Compensation: An Empirical Analysis of Incentive-Intensity, Relative Mix, and Economic Determinants , 2000 .
[16] H. Demsetz,et al. The Structure of Corporate Ownership: Causes and Consequences , 1985, Journal of Political Economy.
[17] James C. Sesil,et al. Broad-Based Employee Stock Options in Us 'New Economy' Firms , 2002 .
[18] Brad M. Barber,et al. Detecting Long-Run Abnormal Stock Returns: The Empirical Power and Specification of Test Statistics , 1997 .
[19] Richard W. Hamming,et al. Numerical Methods for Scientists and Engineers , 1962 .
[20] John M. Barron,et al. Executive compensation. , 1990, Trustee : the journal for hospital governing boards.
[21] John M. Abowd,et al. Does Performance-Based Managerial Compensation Affect Corporate Performance? , 1990 .
[22] Ross L. Watts,et al. The Investment Opportunity Set and Corporate Financing, Dividend, and Compensation Policies , 1992 .
[23] Rajiv D. Banker,et al. Executive Compensation in the Information Technology Industry , 2000 .
[24] John E. Core,et al. The Use of Equity Grants to Manage Optimal Equity Incentive Levels , 1999 .
[25] David Yermack,et al. Do Corporations Award CEO Stock Options Effectively , 1994 .
[26] Don M. Chance,et al. The `repricing’ of executive stock options , 2000 .
[27] David Yermack,et al. Good Timing: CEO Stock Option Awards and Company News Announcements , 1995 .
[28] John E. Core,et al. Stock Option Plans for Non-Executive Employees , 2000 .
[29] Joseph R. Blasi,et al. Employee Stock Ownership and Corporate Performance among Public Companies , 1996 .
[30] G. Baker. Incentive Contracts and Performance Measurement , 1992, Journal of Political Economy.
[31] Thomas S. Zorn,et al. The Effect of Executive Stock Option Plans on Stockholders and Bondholders , 1990 .
[32] Daniel R. Siegel,et al. On the Observational Equivalence of Managerial Contracts Under Conditions of Moral Hazard and Self-Selection , 1988 .
[33] The Internet Downturn: Finding Valuation Factors in Spring 2000 , 2001 .
[34] David F. Larcker,et al. The Structure of Organizational Incentives , 1993 .
[35] John R. Graham,et al. How Big are the Tax Benefits of Debt , 2000 .
[36] E. Lazear,et al. Rank-Order Tournaments as Optimum Labor Contracts , 1979, Journal of Political Economy.
[37] M. Conyon,et al. Shared Modes of Compensation and Firm Performance: UK Evidence , 2001 .
[38] Kewei Hou,et al. Market Frictions, Price Delay, and the Cross-Section of Expected Returns , 2003 .
[39] Rajiv D. Banker,et al. Sensitivity, Precision, and Linear Aggregation of Signals for Performance Evaluation , 1989 .
[40] E. Blum. Numerical analysis and computation theory and practice , 1972 .
[41] David F. Larcker,et al. Business unit innovation and the structure of executive compensation , 1995 .
[42] David Aboody,et al. CEO stock option awards and the timing of corporate voluntary disclosures , 2000 .
[43] Canice Prendergast,et al. What Trade-off of Risk and Incentives? , 2000 .
[44] Jennifer J. Gaver,et al. Additional evidence on the association between the investment opportunity set and corporate , 1993 .
[45] R. Innes. Limited liability and incentive contracting with ex-ante action choices , 1990 .
[46] Robert P. Magee,et al. Internet downturn: finding valuation factors in Spring 2000 , 2001 .
[47] R J Harris,et al. A Comparison of Regression and Loading Weights for the Computation of Factor Scores. , 1998, Multivariate behavioral research.
[48] B. L. Miller,et al. The Valuation Implications of Employee Stock Option Accounting for Computer Software Firms , 2001 .
[49] Greg Clinch,et al. Employee Compensation and Firms' Research and Development Activity , 1991 .
[50] David Aboody,et al. Market valuation of employee stock options , 1996 .
[51] L. Gómez-Mejia,et al. IS CEO PAY IN HIGH-TECHNOLOGY FIRMS RELATED TO INNOVATION? , 2000 .
[52] Stock Option Plans for Non-Executive Employees , 2000 .
[53] Bengt Holmstrom,et al. Moral Hazard and Observability , 1979 .
[54] G. Plesko. An Evaluation of Alternative Measures of Corporate Tax Rates , 1999 .
[55] Myron S. Scholes. Taxes and Business Strategy: A Planning Approach , 2001 .
[56] S. Kothari,et al. The Economic Dilution of Employee Stock Options: Diluted Eps for Valuation and Financial Reporting , 2001 .
[57] James C. Sesil,et al. BROAD-BASED EMPLOYEE STOCK OPTIONS IN THE U.S.: DO THEY IMPACT COMPANY PERFORMANCE? , 2000 .
[58] Robert E. Verrecchia,et al. Introducing convexity into optimal compensation contracts , 1999 .
[59] Mark H. Lang,et al. Employee stock option exercises an empirical analysis , 1996 .