Making the Implicit Explicit: Towards an Assurance Case for DO-178C

For about two decades, compliance with Software Considerations in Airborne Systems and Equipment Certification (DO-178B) has been the primary means for receiving regulatory approval for using software on commercial airplanes. A new edition of the standard, DO-178C, was published in December 2011, and regulatory bodies have started the process towards recognizing this edition. The stated purpose of DO-178C remains unchanged from its predecessor: providing guidance for the production of software for airborne systems and equipment that performs its intended function with a level of confidence in safety that complies with airworthiness requirements. Within the text of the guidance, little or no rationale is given for how a particular objective or collection of objectives contributes to achieving this purpose. Thus the assurance case for the document is implicit. This paper discusses a current effort to make the implicit explicit. In particular, the paper describes the current status of the research seeking to identify the specific arguments contained in, or implied by, the DO-178C guidance that implicitly justify the assumption that the document meets its stated purpose.

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