Abstract This essay examines the framework of cues in which the Persian Gulf conflict was presented to the American people by the news media and the degree to which this portrayal facilitated or impeded timely and meaningful public debate of policy responses to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. Analysis of Gulf conflict stories in the New York Times suggests that the range of media coverage was established at each stage of the crisis by the range of “official” debate; that, like that debate, the range of in‐depth views presented was quite narrow; and that media cues throughout the crisis reflected those propounded by the administration and its allies. The authors conclude that the public did not have reasonable access to a sufficiently broad range of information and opinion to make independent judgments about the wisdom of administration policy.
[1]
Daniel C. Hallin,et al.
The uncensored war
,
1993
.
[2]
J. Zaller,et al.
The Nature and Origins of Mass Opinion.
,
1992
.
[3]
W. Bennett,et al.
Toward a Theory of Press-State Relations in the United States
,
1990
.
[4]
Jarol B. Manheim,et al.
Changing National Images: International Public Relations and Media Agenda Setting
,
1983,
American Political Science Review.
[5]
Murray Edelman,et al.
The symbolic uses of politics
,
1967
.
[6]
W. Bennett.
News, the politics of illusion
,
1983
.