论文信息 - A 'threshold aggregation' of three-graded rankings

A 'threshold aggregation' of three-graded rankings

Abstract A problem of axiomatic construction of a social ranking is studied for the case when individual opinions are given as three-graded rankings. It is shown that the only rule satisfying the axioms introduced is the threshold rule.

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