Reduction-consistency in collective choice problems

Abstract We consider the problem of choosing a subset of a feasible set over which each agent has a strict preference. We propose an invariance property, reduction-consistency, of choice rules and study its implications. The property is a natural expression for the problems of a general principle of consistency having been studied extensively in resource allocation problems. We show that no scoring rule satisfies reduction-consistency, and base a characterization of the top rule on the property. We also investigate the minimal extension of a rule needed to recover reduction-consistency, and identify the minimal extensions of several rules including the Borda and plurality rules.

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