The Bayesian Approach

We live in an uncertain world in which decisions have to be taken. From the point of view of the decision-maker, it is obviously desirable to have some reasonably reliable notion of which possible outcomes of their decisions are more or less likely. This seems to be the province of a theory of probability, and the groundwork of one was duly developed in that century we now recognise to inaugurate the era of modern science, the seventeenth century.

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