THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC INFERENCE*

1 Hesse't Problem: a Seeming Paradox of Transitivity. 2 Hesse's Solution: Argument by Analogy and Clustering Postulates. 3 Apparent Counterexamples to Hesse's Solution. 4 A Theorem in Probabilistic Confirmation Theory which Seems to Dissolve Hesse's Problem and Hesse's Solution. 5 Hesse's Argument for the Irrelevance of Theories. 6 Objections, Logical and Psychological, to Hesse's Argument for the Irrelevance of Theories. 7 Hesse's Unwillingness to Assign Finite Probabilities to Universal Generalisations. 8 Good Reasons for Assigning Finite Probabilities to some Universal Generalisations. 9 The Propriety of Assigning Finite Probabilities to each of an Open-Ended Infinity of Universal Generalisations over Infinite Domains. 10 Need we Adopt the Bayesian Prescription for Changing our Beliefs? 11 The Applicability of Convergence-to-Opinion Theorems to the Case of Actual Scientific Inference. 12 Hesse's Claim to be a Bayesian Personalist.