Holism and analytic philosophy

At first glance holism seems to be opposed to analytic philosophy.' It is often associated with a treatment of wholes that is not accessible to the conceptual tools of rational analysis (see, for instance, Bunge 1979, pp. 39-41). None the less, holism with respect to intentional phenomena is widespread among analytic philosophers subsequent to the work of the later Wittgenstein and to Quine's "Two Dogmas of Empiricism" (1951). By endorsing holism, these philosophers do not depart from the standards of rational, analytic argumentation. Furthermore, holism is discussed in science, in particular in the interpretation of quantum physics (see Teller 1986, Howard 1989, and Healey 1991). Opting for holism in any of these areas has noteworthy consequences for our philosophical view of the world and ourselves. Holism in quantum physics is said to refute atomism, which has been predominant in modern philosophy of nature. Holism with respect to intentional phenomena is seen as an alternative to the Cartesian philosophy of mind and knowledge, which dominated modern thought down to logical empiricism. It is an open question whether there are any interesting structural similarities among the various kinds of holism. Before inquiring into such structural similarities, it is desirable to develop a conception of holism which is applicable to all these cases. In this paper, I try to employ conceptual tools of analytic philosophy in order to work out a proposal for a general, precise, and substantial conception of holism. I submit that such a conception should meet the following three requirements: