Unbounded verification, falsification, and characterization of security protocols by pattern refinement

We present a new verification algorithm for security protocols that allows for unbounded verification, falsification, and complete characterization. The algorithm provides a number of novel features, including: (1) Guaranteed termination, after which the result is either unbounded correctness, falsification, or bounded correctness. (2) Efficient generation of a finite representation of an infinite set of traces in terms of patterns, also known as a complete characterization. (3) State-of-the-art performance, which has made new types of protocol analysis feasible, such as multi-protocol analysis.

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