Analysis of the Impact of Combined Information-Physical-Failure on Distribution Network CPS

With the rapid development of ICT technology and automation control technology, the distribution network has gradually transformed into a distribution network cyber-physical system (distribution network CPS) with highly coupled information and physical systems. The information system supports the stable operation of the physical system but also brings about certain security risks to the distribution network CPS. Therefore, information impact should be considered in the original anticipated physical fault assessment. This paper proposes a security analysis and evaluation method for distribution network CPS considering anticipated combined information-physical fault screening. First, based on the CPS structure of the distribution network, a CPS correlation matrix model of the distribution network that can reflect the power-information coupling characteristics is established. Then, we analyze the correlation between information failure and physical failure, and we construct an initial anticipated combined information-physical-fault set according to topology and service correlations. Next, based on the fault recovery rate ordering, the key anticipated combined information-physical fault is selected. Finally, for the selected combination of anticipated failures, an assessment of the distribution network CPS security assessment indicators is carried out and verified via example.

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