Beyond the Carrots and Sticks Paradigm: Rethinking the Cooperation and Verification Mechanism Experience of Bulgaria and Romania†

Abstract A paradigmatic change is urgently needed in European Union's approach towards post-accession conditionality, as demonstrated by the apparent failure of the ‘Cooperation and Verification Mechanism (CVM)’ for Bulgaria and Romania to achieve its objective – assisting the establishment of the rule of law in the two countries. The article maintains that the predominating reward/sanction perspective on post-accession conditionality both in the academic literature and in political practice is inadequate for triggering genuine and sustainable reform progress in the Eastern European candidates. The particular conceptual and procedural deficiencies of the CVM for Bulgaria and Romania as a post-accession conditionality instrument are discussed. It is argued that the CVM has remained mostly an instrument for monitoring and assessment, while the cooperation aspect of the post-accession relationship with Bulgaria and Romania has been neglected. The article proposes an alternative approach, based on partnership.