The Mobilizer's Dilemma: Crisis, Empowerment, and Collective Action

Collective action can be problematic for two reasons — we may get little or no additional benefit from our own efforts should we choose to contribute (the "efficacy problem"), yet we will enjoy the benefits of others' efforts even if we fail to contribute (the "free-rider problem"). Movement mobilizers address the free-rider problem by issuing crisis messages that call attention to impending disaster and the urgent need for action. These messages discourage free riding by making clear that soon there may be no more public resources to enjoy for free. Mobilizers address the efficacy problem by issuing empowerment messages that emphasize the fact that positive change is possible and is, in fact, happening. Crisis messages are especially prominent in the "tragedy of the commons" because of the accelerating impact of overconsumption. The "mobilizer's dilemma" is that crisis messages may actually backfire by undermining belief in the ability to "make a difference," while empowerment messages affirm efficacy but encourage free riding. We tested the hypothesized effects of crisis and empowerment messages under controlled conditions in the laboratory. In two separate experiments, members of a large group were confronted with a resource depletion problem under conditions of uncertainty. We manipulated the content of persuasive messages and measured the effect on self-restraint in harvesting the commons. The results confirmed the mobilizer's dilemma and pointed to a way out.

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