The graph model for conflict resolution with information-gap uncertainty in preferences

Information-gap models, for formally modeling the uncertainty of preferences of decision makers involved in a conflict, are devised for employment with the graph model for conflict resolution. These information-gap models are designed for handling a variety of situations for expressing severe preference-uncertainty of a decision maker, including both transitive and intransitive preferences among the states or possible scenarios in a conflict. Applications of these decision technologies to the game of chicken and the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962 illustrate how the information-gap models can be conveniently utilized in practice and how strategic insights can be gained through rigorous examination of the robustness of equilibrium solutions to uncertainty in preferences. It is also shown that uncertainty-analyses can lead to modification of a decision maker's prior preferences.

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