Offering Rainfall Insurance to Informal Insurance Groups: Evidence from a Field Experiment in Ethiopia

We show theoretically that the presence of basis risk in index insurance makes it a complement to informal risk sharing, implying that index insurance crowds-in risk sharing and leading to a prediction that demand will be higher among groups of individuals that can share risk. We report results from Ethiopia from a first attempt to market weather insurance to informal risk-sharing groups. The groups were offered training on risk management and insurance. We randomized the content of training provided to group leaders, with some sessions focusing on the benefits of informally sharing idiosyncratic basis risk. Consistent with learning informed by the theoretical results, we found that members of groups whose leaders had received training that emphasized risk-sharing had considerably higher uptake. We find that this effect can be explained either by a more careful selection of training participants by leaders or a direct impact of the treatment on insurance demand.

[1]  J. Tobacman,et al.  Marketing Complex Financial Products in Emerging Markets: Evidence from Rainfall Insurance in India , 2011 .

[2]  Louis Eeckhoudt,et al.  Putting risk in its proper place , 2006 .

[3]  J. Hoddinott,et al.  Collective Action and Vulnerability: Burial Societies in Rural Ethiopia , 2008 .

[4]  Miles S. Kimball Precautionary Saving in the Small and in the Large , 1989 .

[5]  Stefan Dercon,et al.  Group-Based Funeral Insurance in Ethiopia and Tanzania. , 2006 .

[6]  Eugene N. Gurenko,et al.  Catastrophe Risk and Reinsurance: A Country Risk Management Perspective , 2004 .

[7]  R. Hill,et al.  Flexible insurance for heterogeneous farmers: Results from a small-scale pilot in Ethiopia , 2011 .

[8]  Dean S. Karlan,et al.  Social Networks, Financial Literacy and Index Insurance , 2013 .

[9]  R. Townsend,et al.  Barriers to Household Risk Management : Evidence from India , 2012 .

[10]  Barry J. Barnett,et al.  Weather Index Insurance for Agriculture and Rural Areas in Lower-Income Countries , 2007 .

[11]  Shawn Cole,et al.  Barriers to Household Risk Management: Evidence from India. , 2010, American economic journal. Applied economics.

[12]  J. Stiglitz,et al.  Moral Hazard and Nonmarket Institutions: Dysfunctional Crowding Out or Peer Monitoring? , 1991 .

[13]  Robert M. Townsend,et al.  Patterns of Rainfall Insurance Participation in Rural India , 2007 .

[14]  X. Giné,et al.  Insurance, Credit, and Technology Adoption: Field Experimental Evidence from Malawi , 2007 .

[15]  Mario J. Miranda,et al.  New approaches to crop yield insurance in developing countries , 1999 .

[16]  M. Rosenzweig,et al.  Selling Formal Insurance to the Informally Insured , 2012 .

[17]  H. Schlesinger,et al.  Rational Insurance Purchasing: Consideration of Contract Nonperformance , 1990 .

[18]  Orazio Attanasio,et al.  Consumption smoothing in island economies : can public insurance reduce welfare? , 2000 .

[19]  Martin Ravallion,et al.  Reciprocity without commitment: Characterization and performance of informal insurance arrangements , 1993 .

[20]  D. Clarke A Theory of Rational Demand for Index Insurance , 2016 .

[21]  L. Christiaensen,et al.  Consumption Risk, Technology Adoption, and Poverty Traps: Evidence from Ethiopia , 2007 .

[22]  D. Clarke Reinsuring the Poor: Group Microinsurance Design and Costly State Verification , 2011 .

[23]  Yuyu Chen,et al.  Microinsurance, Trust and Economic Development: Evidence from a Randomized Natural Field Experiment , 2009 .

[24]  Bilal Zia,et al.  Unpacking the Causal Chain of Financial Literacy , 2011 .

[25]  Miles S. Kimball,et al.  Precautionary Motives for Holding Assets , 1991 .

[26]  Benjamin Feigenberg,et al.  Building Social Capital Through Microfinance , 2010 .