Algorithms for Finding Approximate Formations in Games

Many computational problems in game theory, such as finding Nash equilibria, are algorithmically hard to solve. This limitation forces analysts to limit attention to restricted subsets of the entire strategy space. We develop algorithms to identify rationally closed subsets of the strategy space under given size constraints. First, we modify an existing family of algorithms for rational closure in two-player games to compute a related rational closure concept, called formations, for n-player games. We then extend these algorithms to apply in cases where the utility function is partially specified, or there is a bound on the size of the restricted profile space. Finally, we evaluate the performance of these algorithms on a class of random games.

[1]  J. Nash NON-COOPERATIVE GAMES , 1951, Classics in Game Theory.

[2]  Michael P. Wellman,et al.  Generalization risk minimization in empirical game models , 2009, AAMAS.

[3]  L. Shapley SOME TOPICS IN TWO-PERSON GAMES , 1963 .

[4]  Michael P. Wellman,et al.  Methods for empirical game-theoretic analysis (extended abstract) , 2006 .

[5]  Felix A. Fischer,et al.  Computational aspects of Shapley's saddles , 2009, AAMAS.

[6]  Michael P. Wellman,et al.  Strategy exploration in empirical games , 2010, AAMAS.

[7]  Michael P. Wellman Methods for Empirical Game-Theoretic Analysis , 2006, AAAI.

[8]  David Pearce Rationalizable Strategic Behavior and the Problem of Perfection , 1984 .

[9]  Yoav Shoham,et al.  Run the GAMUT: a comprehensive approach to evaluating game-theoretic algorithms , 2004, Proceedings of the Third International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, 2004. AAMAS 2004..

[10]  Michael P. Wellman,et al.  Empirical game-theoretic analysis of the TAC Supply Chain game , 2007, AAMAS '07.

[11]  John C. Harsanyi,et al.  Общая теория выбора равновесия в играх / A General Theory of Equilibrium Selection in Games , 1989 .

[12]  Tuomas Sandholm,et al.  Algorithms for Rationalizability and CURB Sets , 2006, AAAI.

[13]  John Duggan,et al.  Mixed refinements of Shapley's saddles and weak tournaments , 2001, Soc. Choice Welf..

[14]  J. Weibull,et al.  Strategy subsets closed under rational behavior , 1991 .

[15]  B. Bernheim Rationalizable Strategic Behavior , 1984 .

[16]  Vincent Conitzer,et al.  A Generalized Strategy Eliminability Criterion and Computational Methods for Applying It , 2005, AAAI.