论文信息 - Investigating the Characteristics of One-Sided Matching Mechanisms: (Extended Abstract)

Investigating the Characteristics of One-Sided Matching Mechanisms: (Extended Abstract)

For one-sided matching problems, two widely studied mechanisms are the Random Serial Dictatorship (RSD) and the Probabilistic Serial Rule (PS). The induced outcomes of these two mechanisms are often incomparable and thus there are challenges when it comes to deciding which mechanism to adopt in practice. Working in the space of general preferences, we provide empirical results on the (in)comparability of RSD and PS and analyze their economic properties.

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