Co-resilience Assessment of Hurricane-induced Power Grid and Roadway Network Disruptions: A Case Study in Florida with a Focus on Critical Facilities

Florida's emergency relief operations were significantly affected by recent hurricanes such as Hermine and Irma that caused massive roadway and power system distributions. During these recent devastating hurricanes, the problems associated with providing accessibility and safety became even more challenging, especially for those vulnerable communities and disadvantaged segments of the society, such as aging populations were considered - that is, those who need and benefit from the emergency services the most. This complexity is magnified in states like Florida, considering the diverse physical, cognitive, economic and demographic variation of its population. As such, with a major focus on real-life data on roadway closures and power outages for the Hurricane Hermine, combined resilience (co-resilience) of emergency response facilities in the City of Tallahassee, the capital of Florida, was extensively studied based on the (a) temporal reconstruction of the reported power outages and roadway closures, and (b) development of co-resilience metrics to identify and visually map the most affected power system feeders and transportation network locations. Results show those regions with reduced emergency response facility accessibility, and those power lines and roadways under a disruption risk after Hermine hit Tallahassee.

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