The Possibility of Parity*

Some comparisons are hard. Who is more creative, Mozart or Michelangelo? Mozart is better in some respects of creativity, Michelangelo in others; however, there is no obvious way in which one has the greater creativity tout court. Or take two rather different careers, such as a career in accounting and one in skydiving, or two Sunday enjoyments, such as an afternoon at the museum and one hiking in the woods, or two moral requirements, such as a duty to keep promises and a requirement to avoid causing unnecessary pain. In many such cases, although we agree what considerations are relevant to the comparison, it seems all we can say is that the one alternative is better with respect to some of those considerations while the other is better in others, but it seems there is no truth about how they compare all things considered. Hard cases of comparison are ubiquitous. Indeed, if, as many philosophers believe, the comparability of the alternatives is necessary for justified choice between them, hard cases are very plausibly at the root of moral dilemmas and the most intractable sorts of practical conflict generally. Philosophers typically have one of three reactions to such cases. Epistemicists insist that, although it may be difficult or even impossible to determine how the items compare all things considered, one must