Algorithmic Game Theory: Introduction to the Inefficiency of Equilibria

This chapter presents motivation and definitions for quantifying the inefficiency of equilibria in noncooperative games. We illustrate the basic concepts in four fundamental network models, which are studied in depth in subsequent chapters. We also discuss how measures of the inefficiency of equilibria can guide mechanism and network design.

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