STOCHASTIC VERSUS DETERMINISTIC CONDITIONS IN A COMPETITIVE GAME WITH TWO LENGTHS OF BOARD.

Abstract : An experiment was conducted to determine changes in strategy and ensuing coalitions brought about by stochastic conditions of play, in comparison with deterministic procedure. The latter, as previously employed, fixes the moves of all players at each stage of play. The former permits each player's move to be contingent upon his own action. In a competitive board game, employing triads as subjects, deterministic procedure was established by having players take turns in throwing the dice as agent for all three members of the group. Stochastic procedure was established by allowing each player in turn to throw the dice to determine his own distance of move. In addition, a long and a short board were used to provide an additional test of the tendency to 'gamble.' It was hypothesized that gambling would be manifested under stochastic and shortboard conditions. This should especially be revealed in fewer coalitions. Ten triads of each sex were run under each of the four conditions (two procedures x two boards). They played three successive games each of the powertypes All-Equal (111), All-Different (432), and All-Powerful (421). Pre- and post-session questionnaires were administered. All Ss took the Test of Strategy prior to the game. Analysis of various aspects of strategy disclosed a number of significant differences between conditions, especially between Deterministic Long Board and Stochastic Short Board, as expected. Chiefly, there were fewer coalitions under the stochastic and short board conditions. The overall pattern of differences indicated that players tended to 'gamble' in these conditions, in an effort to win by their own resources.