论文信息 - Incentive schemes as a signaling device

Incentive schemes as a signaling device

Abstract This paper considers a model of moral hazard where the principal has private information. For instance, in an organizational setting, the firm may be better informed about the profitability of a sales area for which it seeks to employ a new sales representative. We show how this information asymmetry may lead to a game of signaling which can mute incentives.

Roman Inderst | R. Inderst

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