Network topology risk assessment of stealthy cyber attacks on advanced metering infrastructure networks

Advanced Metering Infrastructure (AMI) plays a crucial role in Demand Side Management (DSM) in Smart Grid systems. It provides real-time, two-way communication capabilities between a utility/load aggregator and consumers. The communication infrastructure, by virtue of topological weaknesses, is vulnerable to cyber attacks that are undetectable or stealthy. This work investigates the topological vulnerabilities of AMI networks that could result in potential theft of electricity through hacked smart meters. In particular, a provably correct risk assessment protocol is proposed to identify completely the individual nodes in mesh network based AMIs that are potential targets of such economically motivated stealthy cyber attacks. The protocol proposed utilizes knowledge of the network topology and data obtained from existing system monitoring technologies. A case study is provided to demonstrate the protocol and its effectiveness.

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