Competition versus monopoly in the provision of police

This article discusses the changing landscape of US crime, and both describes and evaluates the growth of private security in total security provided. Since the mid-1970s violent and basic property crimes have constantly declined while the number of economic crimes like identity theft, counterfeit goods and cyber misdeeds increased substantially. Monopolistic police have not addressed the changing landscape of crime and continue to deliver their traditional services. As market forces have limited influence on government, private security that is highly competitive and client oriented has been quicker to adopt technology and management innovations and address the new types of crime. Private police are estimated to be three times larger than public law enforcement. The article concludes that the increased penetration of private security is socially beneficial by improving efficiency, delivering client-oriented services and forcing police to improve their performance.

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