The Economics Of Compatibility Standards: An Introduction To Recent Research 1

This paper surveys the contributions that economists have made to understanding standards-setting processes and their consequences for industry structure and economic welfare. Standardization processes of four kinds are examined, namely: (1) market competition involving products embodying unsponsored standards, (2) market competition among sponsored (proprietary) standards, (3) agreements within voluntary standards-writing organizations, a18d (4) direct governmental promulgation. The major trajectories along which research has been moving are described and related to both the positive and the normative issues concerning compatibility standards that remain to be studied.

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