Green markets, eco-certification, and equilibrium fraud

[1]  M. Darby,et al.  Free Competition and the Optimal Amount of Fraud , 1973, The Journal of Law and Economics.

[2]  S. Rosen,et al.  Monopoly and product quality , 1978 .

[3]  John Conlisk,et al.  Product Quality in Markets Where Consumers are Imperfectly Informed , 1979 .

[4]  W. Hausman.  A Model of the London Coal Trade in the Eighteenth Century , 1980 .

[5]  Franklin Allen,et al.  Reputation and Product Quality , 1984 .

[6]  W. Novshek.  On the Existence of Cournot Equilibrium , 1985 .

[7]  Abraham Hollander,et al.  Duopoly and quality standards , 1991 .

[8]  Roland Bénabou,et al.  Search with Learning from Prices: Does Increased Inflationary Uncertainty Lead to Higher Markups? , 1993 .

[9]  Jean Tirole,et al.  A Theory of Collective Reputations (with applications to the persistence of corruption and to firm quality) , 1996 .

[10]  John Vickers,et al.  Performance Comparisons and Dynamic Incentives , 1997, Journal of Political Economy.

[11]  Stefanie Engel.  Achieving Environmental Goals in a World of Trade and Hidden Action: The Role of Trade Policies and Eco-Labeling , 1998 .

[12]  Roger A. Sedjo,et al.  Eco-Labeling Consequences in General Equilibrium: A Graphical Assessment , 2000 .

[13]  P. Rzewnicki.  Ohio organic producers: final survey results. , 2000 .

[14]  M. Jerrett,et al.  Economy-wide effects of forest policies: a general equilibrium assessment from Vietnam. , 2000 .

[15]  A. Malik,et al.  Further Results on Permit Markets with Market Power and Cheating , 2002 .

[16]  David Zilberman,et al.  Public goods and the value of product quality regulations: the case of food safety , 2003 .

[17]  Erkki Koskela,et al.  Environmental quality competition and eco-labeling , 2004 .

[18]  G. Grolleau,et al.  Can Ecolabeling Schemes Preserve the Environment? , 2008 .