论文信息 - Equilibria in repeated games of incomplete information: The general symmetric case

Equilibria in repeated games of incomplete information: The general symmetric case

Abstract. Every two person repeated game of symmetric incomplete information, in which the signals sent at each stage to both players are identical and generated by a state and moves dependent probability distribution on a given finite alphabet, has an equilibrium payoff.

Sylvain Sorin | Abraham Neyman | A. Neyman | S. Sorin

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