Threat Analysis of Cryptographic Election Schemes

We discuss some vulnerabilities, threats and counter-measures for voter-verifiable, cryptographic election schemes: Chaum~\cite{chaum104:e-vote}, Neff~\cite{neff104:e-vote} and Pr\^{e}t \`{a} Voter schemes~\cite{chaum05:evote}. Our analysis shows that such schemes are potentially prey to a wide variety of threats, both technical and socio-technical. On the other hand, counter-measures can be deployed to all the threats identified. This paper strives to take initial steps towards a more systematic threat analysis for such schemes. We briefly address the issue of how to ensure such threat analyses are as systematic and complete as possible. © 2006 University of Newcastle upon Tyne. Printed and published by the University of Newcastle upon Tyne, Computing Science, Claremont Tower, Claremont Road, Newcastle upon Tyne, NE1 7RU, England. Bibliographical details RYAN, P. Y. A., PEACOCK, T.. Threat Analysis of Cryptographic Election Schemes [By] P. Y. A. Ryan and T. Peacock. Newcastle upon Tyne: University of Newcastle upon Tyne: Computing Science, 2006. (University of Newcastle upon Tyne, Computing Science, Technical Report Series, No. CS-TR-971)