Learning from Conflict: The U.S. Military in Vietnam, El Salvador, and the Drug War

Preface and Reader's Guide Abbreviations Introduction and Theoretical Overview Overview and Background The Sources of Doctrinal Change: Structuring Contending Explanations Development and Evolution of U.S. Doctrine for Counterinsurgency and LIC Case Study 1: Analyzing Change to Published Doctrine for Counterinsurgency in the Post-Vietnam War Era Official Army Studies on Counterinsurgency and Identifying Shortcomings Counterinsurgency Doctrine in the Post-Vietnam War Era: Has There Been Conceptual Change? Did the U.S. Army Learn?: Assessing the Doctrinal Evidence Case Study 2: Testing for Doctrinal Continuity: The U.S. Counterinsurgency Assistance Effort in El Salvador "Drawing the Line" in Central America: U.S. Counterinsurgency Assistance in El Salvador Counterinsurgency from Vietnam to El Salvador: Testing for Doctrinal Continuity Why Didn't Counterinsurgency Doctrine Change After the Vietnam War: Testing Hypotheses Case Study 3: Testing for Doctrinal Change or Continuity: The Drug War in the Andean Ridge Fighting The Drug War on the Andean Ridge Explaining Doctrinal Change: The Drug War on the Andean Ridge Conclusions and Recommendations Theoretical Conclusions Recommendations: LIC and Military Organizations as Learning Institutions Appendix: Measuring Change in Doctrine for Counterinsurgency Selected Bibliography Index