This paper studies the informational content of elective teams in a dynamic principal/multiple-agents framework with adverse selection. Two agents with different employment histories are paid their conditional expected marginal product. They observe their types (good or bad), and choose between working together or separately. We characterize the distributions on agents' types, nature and wages such that teams are formed exclusively by good-type agents, with and without side payments. As employment records matter when idiosyncratic contributions are difficult to isolate, a good-type agent prefers not to jeopardize his reputation by teaming up with a bad-type agent. Cet article etudie le contenu informationel des equipes facultatives, dans le cadre d'un modele dynamique de principal-agent avec selection adverse. Deux agents ayant des historiques d'emploi differents recoivent leur produit marginal espere conditionnel. Ils observent leurs types (bon ou mauvais) et doivent decider s'ils veulent travailler ensemble ou separement. Nous caracterisons la distribution sur les types, les chocs de la nature et les salaires pour lesquelles des equipes sont formees exclusivement par deux agents de bon type, avec ou sans paiements lateraux. Parce que les dossiers d'emploi sont valorises lorsque les contributions individuelles sont difficiles a evaluer, un agent de bon type refuse de mettre en peril sa reputation en formant une equipe avec un agent de mauvais type.
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