Abstract : For the first time, the U.S. Navy faces a period that could last a number of years in which there will be no design program under way for a new class of nuclear-powered submarines. The resulting lack of demand for the services of submarine designers and engineers raises concerns that this highly specialized capability could atrophy, burdening the next submarine design effort with extra costs, delays and risks. In 2005 the Program Executive Office (PEO) for Submarines asked the RAND Corporation to evaluate the cost and schedule impacts of various strategies for managing submarine design resources. Of concern were the design resources at Electric Boat and at Northrop Grumman Newport News (the two shipyards that have previously designed classes of nuclear submarines), as well as design resources at the key vendors that provide components for nuclear submarines and the technical resources of the various Navy organizations that oversee and participate in nuclear submarine design programs. RAND's analysis built upon similar research RAND conducted for the United Kingdom both upon similar research RAND conducted for the United Kingdom's Ministry of Defense. This repot documents the methods and findings of the research that RAND carried out for PEO Submarines.
[1]
Jefferson P. Marquis,et al.
The United Kingdom's Naval Shipbuilding Industrial Base: The Next Fifteen Years
,
2005
.
[2]
John Birkler,et al.
The United Kingdom’s Nuclear Submarine Industrial Base, Volume 1
,
2005
.
[3]
John Birkler,et al.
The U.S. Submarine Production Base
,
1994
.
[4]
John Birkler,et al.
Reconstituting a Production Capability
,
1993
.
[5]
John Birkler,et al.
The U.S. Aircraft Carrier Industrial Base: Force Structure, Cost, Schedule, and Technology Issues for CVN 77
,
1998
.