An experimental test of a predator–prey model of appropriation

Abstract Grossman and Kim’s [Predation and production. In: Garfinkel, M.R., Skaperdas, S. (Eds.), The Political Economy of Conflict and Appropriation. Cambridge University Press, New York, 1996, pp. 57–71] predator–prey model predicts that as the effectiveness of offense against defense increases, the equilibrium appropriation effort will change from zero to full to partial predation. We test the model experimentally over a sequence of eight decision periods. The data show a clear and substantial convergence to equilibrium outcomes, with most movement occurring in the first several periods.

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