Robust Mechanism Design
暂无分享,去创建一个
[1] J. Harsanyi. Games with Incomplete Information Played by 'Bayesian' Players, Part III. The Basic Probability Distribution of the Game , 1968 .
[2] A. Ostaszewski. TOPOLOGY AND BOREL STRUCTURE , 1976 .
[3] L. Hurwicz. On informationally decentralized systems , 1977 .
[4] J. Ledyard. Incentive compatibility and incomplete information , 1978 .
[5] C. d'Aspremont,et al. Incentives and incomplete information , 1979 .
[6] E. Maskin,et al. The Implementation of Social Choice Rules: Some General Results on Incentive Compatibility , 1979 .
[7] M. Walker. On the Nonexistence of a Dominant Strategy Mechanism for Making Optimal Public Decisions , 1980 .
[8] Stefan Reichelstein,et al. On the Informational Requirements for the Implementation of Social Choice Rules , 1981 .
[9] Roger B. Myerson,et al. Optimal Auction Design , 1981, Math. Oper. Res..
[10] R. Myerson,et al. Efficient and Durable Decision Rules with Incomplete Information , 1983 .
[11] Robert B. Wilson. Game-Theoretic Analysis of Trading Processes. , 1985 .
[12] S. Zamir,et al. Formulation of Bayesian analysis for games with incomplete information , 1985 .
[13] Robert H. Wilson. Incentive Efficiency of Double Auctions , 1985 .
[14] Richard P. McLean,et al. Optimal Selling Strategies under Uncertainty for a Discriminating Monopolist When Demands Are Interdependent , 1985 .
[15] Andrew Postlewaite,et al. Implementation in differential information economies , 1986 .
[16] W. Rogerson,et al. Robust trading mechanisms , 1987 .
[17] Adam Brandenburger,et al. Rationalizability and Correlated Equilibria , 1987 .
[18] Richard P. McLean,et al. FULL EXTRACTION OF THE SURPLUS IN BAYESIAN AND DOMINANT STRATEGY AUCTIONS , 1988 .
[19] J. Robert. Continuity In Auction Design , 1991 .
[20] T. Palfrey,et al. Implementation with Incomplete Information in Exchange Economies , 1989 .
[21] H. Siebert. Privatization : symposium in honor of Herbert Giersch , 1992 .
[22] P. Reny,et al. Correlated Information and Mechanism Design , 1992 .
[23] Dilip Mookherjee,et al. Dominant Strategy Implementation of Bayesian incentive Compatible Allocation Rules , 1992 .
[24] E. Maskin,et al. Auctions and Privatization , 1992 .
[25] Hitoshi Matsushima,et al. Virtual implementation in iteratively undominated strategies: complete information , 1992 .
[26] B. Hunt. Prevalence: a translation-invariant “almost every” on infinite-dimensional spaces , 1992, math/9210220.
[27] Eddie Dekel,et al. Hierarchies of Beliefs and Common Knowledge , 1993 .
[28] A. Heifetz. The bayesian formulation of incomplete information — The non-compact case , 1993 .
[29] Sylvain Sorin,et al. Repeated Games. Part A: Background Material , 1994 .
[30] A. Mas-Colell,et al. Microeconomic Theory , 1995 .
[31] B. Moldovanu,et al. E ¢ cient Design with Interdependent Valuations , 1996 .
[32] A. Heifetz,et al. Topology-Free Typology of Beliefs , 1998 .
[33] S. Morris,et al. The Robustness of Equilibria to Incomplete Information , 1997 .
[34] Barton L. Lipman,et al. FINITE ORDER IMPLICATIONS OF COMMON PRIORS , 1997 .
[35] B. Moldovanu,et al. Efficient Design with Interdependent Valuations , 2001 .
[36] Faruk Gul. A Comment on Aumann's Bayesian View , 1998 .
[37] Giuseppe Lopomo. The English Auction Is Optimal Among Simple Sequential Auctions , 1998 .
[38] Philip J. Reny,et al. An Ex-Post E¢cient Auction¤ , 1999 .
[39] Taesung Kim,et al. A Nonparametric, Efficient Public Good Decision Mechanism: Undominated Bayesian Implementation , 1999 .
[40] E. Maskin. Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality , 1999 .
[41] Pierpaolo Battigalli,et al. Rationalizability in Incomplete Information Games , 1999 .
[42] Philip J. Reny,et al. An ex-post efficient auction , 1999 .
[43] Dov Samet,et al. Coherent beliefs are not always types , 1999 .
[44] Dirk Bergemann,et al. Information Acquisition and Efficient Mechanism Design , 2000 .
[45] Vol Cxv Issue. EFFICIENT AUCTIONS , 2000 .
[46] Yossi Feinberg,et al. Characterizing Common Priors in the Form of Posteriors , 2000, J. Econ. Theory.
[47] S. Morris,et al. Global Games: Theory and Applications , 2001 .
[48] Giuseppe Lopomo. Optimality and Robustness of the English Auction , 2001, Games Econ. Behav..
[49] Eric Maskin,et al. Auctions and Efficiency , 2001 .
[50] William R. Zame,et al. Genericity with Infinitely Many Parameters , 2001 .
[51] T. Sargent,et al. Robust Control and Model Uncertainty , 2001 .
[52] P. Reny,et al. AN EFFICIENT AUCTION , 2002 .
[53] K. Eliaz. Fault Tolerant Implementation , 2002 .
[54] Pierpaolo Battigalli,et al. Rationalization and Incomplete Information , 2003 .
[55] Jacques Crémer,et al. Correlation, independence, and Bayesian incentives , 2003, Soc. Choice Welf..
[56] Jeffrey C. Ely,et al. Implementation with Near-Complete Information , 2003 .
[57] Zvika Neeman,et al. The relevance of private information in mechanism design , 2004, J. Econ. Theory.
[58] Jacques Crémer,et al. Balanced Bayesian Mechanisms ∗ , 2017 .
[59] John C. Harsanyi,et al. Games with Incomplete Information Played by "Bayesian" Players, I-III: Part I. The Basic Model& , 2004, Manag. Sci..
[60] E. Kalai. Large Robust Games , 2004 .
[61] Drew Fudenberg,et al. Learning to Play Bayesian Games , 2001, Games Econ. Behav..
[62] Stephen Morris,et al. Robust Implementation: The Role of Large Type Spaces , 2005 .
[63] Stephen Morris,et al. Topologies on Types , 2005 .
[64] B. Moldovanu,et al. The Limits of ex post Implementation , 2006 .