论文信息 - Policy through software defaults

Policy through software defaults

As part of digital government, policymakers are increasingly considering the use software to influence societal concerns such as privacy, freedom of speech, and intellectual property protection. A necessary step is deciding what the settings should be for software. In this paper, we build upon work in computer science and behavioral economics to argue how defaults in software should be set.

Jay P. Kesan | Rajiv C. Shah | J. Kesan

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