Arrow's Impossibility Theorem: Preference Diversity in a Single-Profile World

In this paper we provide a simple new version of Arrow’s impossibility theorem, in a world with only one preference profile. This theorem relies on a new assumption of preference diversity, and we explore alternative notions of preference diversity at length.

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