Conflict Between Intuitive and Rational Processing: When People Behave Against Their Better Judgment

When offered an opportunity to win $1 on every "win" trial in which they drew a red jelly bean, subjects frequently elected to draw from a bowl that contained a greater absolute number, but a smaller proportion, of red beans (e.g., 7 in 100) than from a bowl with fewer red beans but better odds (e.g., 1 in 10). Subjects reported that although they knew the probabilities were against them, they felt they had a better chance when there were more red beans. Similar, but less extreme results were obtained on "lose" trials, where drawing a red bean meant losing $1. These results were predicted from the concretive and experiential principles of cognitive-experiential self-theory. Nonoptimal choices in the laboratory were significantly correlated with heuristic responses to relevant vignettes and with self-reported gambling in real life. The traditional view of human decisional processes by social scientists has been that people make rational decisions predicated on maximizing pleasure or gains and minimizing pain or losses. Over the past several decades, this rational model has been increasingly challenged from a variety of theoretical perspectives as well as on empirical grounds (e.g., Bruner, 1986; Epstein, 1973; Epstein, Lipson, Holstein, & Huh, 1992; Johnson-Laird, 1983; Kahneman, Slovic, & Tversky, 1982; Kirkpatrick& Epstein, 1992; Nisbett& Ross, 1980; Simon, 1957; Tversky & Kahneman, 1982; for reviews, see Epstein, in press; Fiske & Taylor, 1991; Sherman & Corty, 1984). Several of these approaches assume that people process information in two different modes, one identified by terms such as rational, analytical, deliberative, propositional, and extensional and the other by terms such as experiential, automatic, intuitive, narrative, and natural. It is within the framework of one of these approaches, cognitive-experiential self-theory (CEST), that the studies reported in this article were conducted. According to CEST, individuals apprehend reality by two interactive, parallel processing systems. The rational system, a relative newcomer on the evolutionary scene, is a deliberative, verbally mediated, primarily conscious analytical system that functions by a person's understanding of conventionally established rules of logic and evidence. The experiential system, which is considered to be shared by all higher order organisms (although more complex in humans), has a much longer evolu

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