Usurping Double-Ending Fraud in Real Estate Transactions via Blockchain Technology

This paper discusses the problem of double-ending fraud in real estate transactions – a type of transactional fraud wherein agents handling real estate transactions unfairly benefit (e.g., by simultaneously representing both the buy and sell side of a real estate transaction in a manner that unfairly boosts the commission they receive, or colluding to increase their commission in a real estate transaction at the expense of the buyer and/or seller of the real property). The paper proposes a unique blockchain solution design that leverages blockchain's properties of transparency and ability to create tamper-resistant audit trails to reduce opportunities for double-ending fraud and increase real estate market participants' trust in the handling of their transactions. The paper discusses the implementation of a prototype of the solution based on hyperledger fabric and sails; it presents the results of an agent-based modelling simulation validating that the inherent transparency of the proposed design offers optimal allocation for both sellers and buyers.

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