Can ranking techniques elicit robust values?

This paper reports two experiments which examine the use of ranking methods to elicit ‘certainty equivalent’ values. It investigates whether such methods are able to eliminate the disparities between choice and value which constitute the ‘preference reversal phenomenon’ and which thereby pose serious problems for both theory and policy application. The results show that ranking methods are vulnerable to distorting effects of their own, but that when such effects are controlled for, the preference reversal phenomenon, previously so strong and striking, is very considerably attenuated.

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