FlexAuc: Serving Dynamic Demands in a Spectrum Trading Market With Flexible Auction

In secondary spectrum trading markets, auctions are widely used by spectrum holders (SHs) to redistribute their unused channels to secondary wireless service providers (WSPs). As sellers, the SHs design proper auction schemes to stimulate more participants and to maximize the revenue from the auction. As buyers, the WSPs determine the bidding strategies in the auction to better serve their end users. In this paper, we consider a three-layered spectrum trading market consisting of the SH, the WSPs, and the end users. We jointly study the strategies of the three parties. The SH determines the auction scheme and spectrum supplies to optimize its revenue. The WSPs have flexible bidding strategies in terms of both demands and valuations considering the strategies of the end users. For this market, we design a novel auction mechanism called FlexAuc to enable dynamic supplies and demands in the auction. We theoretically prove that FlexAuc not only maximizes the social welfare but also preserves other nice properties such as truthfulness and computational tractability.

[1]  Bo Li,et al.  TAHES: A Truthful Double Auction Mechanism for Heterogeneous Spectrums , 2012, IEEE Transactions on Wireless Communications.

[2]  Jianwei Huang,et al.  Cognitive Mobile Virtual Network Operator: Investment and Pricing with Supply Uncertainty , 2009, 2010 Proceedings IEEE INFOCOM.

[3]  Tao Jiang,et al.  Spectrum leasing to femto service provider with hybrid access , 2012, 2012 Proceedings IEEE INFOCOM.

[4]  Giuseppe Caire,et al.  An iterative water-filling algorithm for maximum weighted sum-rate of Gaussian MIMO-BC , 2006, IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications.

[5]  Xia Zhou,et al.  eBay in the Sky: strategy-proof wireless spectrum auctions , 2008, MobiCom '08.

[6]  Chunming Qiao,et al.  SPECIAL: A strategy-proof and Efficient multi-channel Auction mechanism for wireless networks , 2013, 2013 Proceedings IEEE INFOCOM.

[7]  William Vickrey,et al.  Counterspeculation, Auctions, And Competitive Sealed Tenders , 1961 .

[8]  R. McAfee,et al.  A dominant strategy double auction , 1992 .

[9]  Jin Zhang,et al.  Database-assisted multi-AP network on TV white spaces: Architecture, spectrum allocation and AP discovery , 2011, 2011 IEEE International Symposium on Dynamic Spectrum Access Networks (DySPAN).

[10]  Bo Li,et al.  HEAD: A hybrid spectrum trading framework for QoS-aware secondary users , 2014, 2014 IEEE International Symposium on Dynamic Spectrum Access Networks (DYSPAN).

[11]  Qian Zhang,et al.  Groupon in the Air: A three-stage auction framework for Spectrum Group-buying , 2013, 2013 Proceedings IEEE INFOCOM.

[12]  E. H. Clarke Multipart pricing of public goods , 1971 .

[13]  Mingyan Liu,et al.  Revenue generation for truthful spectrum auction in dynamic spectrum access , 2009, MobiHoc '09.

[14]  Xia Zhou,et al.  TRUST: A General Framework for Truthful Double Spectrum Auctions , 2009, IEEE INFOCOM 2009.

[15]  Qian Zhang,et al.  Flexauc: Serving dynamic demands in spectrum trading markets with flexible auction , 2014, INFOCOM.

[16]  Mo Dong,et al.  Combinatorial auction with time-frequency flexibility in cognitive radio networks , 2012, 2012 Proceedings IEEE INFOCOM.

[17]  Jianwei Huang,et al.  Competition with Dynamic Spectrum Leasing , 2010, 2010 IEEE Symposium on New Frontiers in Dynamic Spectrum (DySPAN).

[18]  Lawrence M. Ausubel,et al.  Demand Reduction and Inefficiency in Multi-Unit Auctions , 2014 .

[19]  Theodore Groves,et al.  Incentives in Teams , 1973 .

[20]  Edward W. Knightly,et al.  Proceedings of the tenth ACM international symposium on Mobile ad hoc networking and computing , 2009, MobiHoc 2009.

[21]  Fan Wu,et al.  A Strategy-Proof Radio Spectrum Auction Mechanism in Noncooperative Wireless Networks , 2013, IEEE Transactions on Mobile Computing.

[22]  Xi Fang,et al.  Truthful auction for cooperative communications , 2011, MobiHoc '11.

[23]  Xu Chen,et al.  Database-Assisted Distributed Spectrum Sharing , 2013, IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications.

[24]  Baochun Li,et al.  Towards Optimal Capacity Segmentation with Hybrid Cloud Pricing , 2012, 2012 IEEE 32nd International Conference on Distributed Computing Systems.

[25]  Athanasios V. Vasilakos,et al.  A Framework for Truthful Online Auctions in Cloud Computing with Heterogeneous User Demands , 2016, IEEE Transactions on Computers.