From Threat and Error Management (TEM) to Resilience

Threat and error management (TEM) is a new crucial component of pilot licensing regulations, with the aim to prepare crews with the coordinative and cogni- tive ability to handle both routine and unforeseen surprises and anomalies. In this paper we argue against a possible technicalization of threat and error management, as if they were objective variables in the environment that determined particular re- sponses. We show instead that the social processes by which the most persuasive rendering of a threat or error is constituted, says more about a crew's ability to han- dle diversity and adversity then any successful outcome. We propose a differentia- tion between technical and normative failures, a division that has ramifications for how threat-and-error management can be taught. We conclude with a set of key indi- cators for resilient crews—crews who are capable of recognizing, adapting to, and absorbing threats and disturbances that went outside what they and their training were designed for.

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