The Nature of Institutional Change in Transition

Contemporary empirical evidence of transition in Central and East European countries proves the importance of institutional change, as was claimed by advocates of this field of transition. The article assesses institutional change in the first phases of transition from the perspective of competing strategies: rapid changes versus gradualism. After pointing to some inconsistencies in this debate, the article discusses the possibility and prospects for development of a market for institutions in European transition countries. The main criterion which is used is the requirement for the rule of law as one of the foundations of a market economy. It concludes that undeveloped endogenous factors of institutional change still do not enable development of markets for institutions. Reluctance of national governments to act according to a long-run perspective is at present to a certain extent compensated by the presence of external factors of institutional change.

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