A Parametrization of the Auction Design Space

Abstract We present an extensive breakdown of the auction design space that captures the essential similarities and differences of many auction mechanisms in a format more descriptive and useful than simple taxonomies. This parametrization serves as an organizational framework in which to classify work within the field and uncovers parameter combinations corresponding to novel mechanisms. The structured characterization of auction rules can be exploited for the modular design of configurable auction servers. It also facilitates the communication of auction rules to software agents, enabling the automation of flexible market-based negotiation. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C70, D44.

[1]  Paula J. Brewer Decentralized computation procurement and computational robustness in a smart market , 1999 .

[2]  E. H. Clarke Multipart pricing of public goods , 1971 .

[3]  Theodore Groves,et al.  Incentives in Teams , 1973 .

[4]  A. Mas-Colell,et al.  Microeconomic Theory , 1995 .

[5]  Ronald M. Harstad,et al.  Computationally Manageable Combinational Auctions , 1998 .

[6]  Michael P. Wellman,et al.  Distributed quiescence detection in multiagent negotiation , 2000, Proceedings Fourth International Conference on MultiAgent Systems.

[7]  Michael P. Wellman,et al.  Flexible double auctions for electronic commerce: theory and implementation , 1998, Decis. Support Syst..

[8]  Mark A. Satterthwaite,et al.  The Bayesian theory of the k-double auction: Santa Fe Institute Studies in the Sciences of Complexity , 2018 .

[9]  Michael P. Wellman,et al.  Online learning about other agents in a dynamic multiagent system , 1998, AGENTS '98.

[10]  Steven R. Williams,et al.  Bilateral trade with the sealed bid k-double auction: Existence and efficiency , 1989 .

[11]  Pablo Noriega,et al.  Competitive scenarios for heterogeneous trading agents , 1998, AGENTS '98.

[12]  R. McAfee,et al.  Analyzing the Airwaves Auction , 1996 .

[13]  David S. Johnson,et al.  Computers and Intractability: A Guide to the Theory of NP-Completeness , 1978 .

[14]  Ilya Segal,et al.  Solutions manual for Microeconomic theory : Mas-Colell, Whinston and Green , 1997 .

[15]  Manoj Kumar,et al.  Internet Auctions , 1998, USENIX Workshop on Electronic Commerce.

[16]  Peter R. Wurman,et al.  Equilibrium Prices in Bundle Auctions , 1999 .

[17]  R. McAfee,et al.  Auctions and Bidding , 1986 .

[18]  R. Engelbrecht-Wiggans Auctions and Bidding Models: A Survey , 1979 .

[19]  J. Banks,et al.  Allocating uncertain and unresponsive resources: an experimental approach. , 1989, The Rand journal of economics.

[20]  S. Rassenti,et al.  A Combinatorial Auction Mechanism for Airport Time Slot Allocation , 1982 .

[21]  Paul R. Milgrom,et al.  A theory of auctions and competitive bidding , 1982 .

[22]  R. McAfee,et al.  A dominant strategy double auction , 1992 .

[23]  Michael P. Wellman A Market-Oriented Programming Environment and its Application to Distributed Multicommodity Flow Problems , 1993, J. Artif. Intell. Res..

[24]  J. Ledyard,et al.  A NEW AND IMPROVED DESIGN FOR MULTI-OBJECT ITERATIVE AUCTIONS , 1999 .

[25]  Michael P. Wellman,et al.  Market-aware agents for a multiagent world , 1998, Robotics Auton. Syst..

[26]  T. Bewley Advances in Economic Theory: Fifth World Congress , 2009 .

[27]  R. Palmer,et al.  Characterizing effective trading strategies: Insights from a computerized double auction tournament , 1994 .

[28]  Pattie Maes,et al.  Agent-mediated electronic commerce: a survey , 1998, The Knowledge Engineering Review.

[29]  Michael P. Wellman Market-aware agents for a multiagent world , 1997, Robotics Auton. Syst..

[30]  Stephen J. Rassenti,et al.  Designing a Uniform-Price Double Auction: An Experimental Evaluation , 1993 .

[31]  Pablo Noriega,et al.  FM96.5 A Java-based Electronic Auction House , 1997, PAAM.

[32]  D. Gale,et al.  Multi-Item Auctions , 1986, Journal of Political Economy.

[33]  C. Plott,et al.  A BINARY CONFLICT ASCENDING PRICE (BICAP) MECHANISM FOR THE DECENTRALIZED ALLOCATION OF THE RIGHT TO USE RAILROAD TRACKS. , 1996 .

[34]  Tracy Mullen,et al.  Market-Based Negotiation for Digital Library Services , 1996 .

[35]  Michael P. Wellman,et al.  The WALRAS Algorithm: A Convergent Distributed Implementation of General Equilibrium Outcomes , 1998 .

[36]  David C. Parkes,et al.  Cost and Trust Issues in On-Line Auctions , 1998 .

[37]  David C. Parkes,et al.  iBundle: an efficient ascending price bundle auction , 1999, EC '99.

[38]  R. Engelbrecht-Wiggans State of the Art—Auctions and Bidding Models: A Survey , 1980 .

[39]  Michael P. Wellman,et al.  The Michigan Internet AuctionBot: a configurable auction server for human and software agents , 1998, AGENTS '98.

[40]  Oren Etzioni,et al.  A scalable comparison-shopping agent for the World-Wide Web , 1997, AGENTS '97.

[41]  William Vickrey,et al.  Counterspeculation, Auctions, And Competitive Sealed Tenders , 1961 .

[42]  Jeffrey K. MacKie-Mason,et al.  Generalized Vickrey Auctions , 1994 .

[43]  Peter R. Wurman,et al.  Market structure and multidimensional auction design for computational economies , 1999 .